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of you is to return his love, which means becoming a person with certain
very particular (largely liturgical) habits. That is no doubt too extreme as
a formulation. It may nevertheless serve to point out the difficulty here.
Does Hedley’s version of Christianity really mean that we should forget
about the virtues? If not, why not?
And on the third and final difficulty, about kinds of image. Hold in
your mind’s eye a high-sublime image like almost any painting by Caspar
David Friedrich (a painter of whom Hedley approves). Contemplate it for
a while. You’ll feel the shiver: the wild gorges, the setting suns, the small
human figures in a vast natural background, the crags, the ruins (think of
Wordsworth’s “Lines Composed a Few Miles Above Tintern Abbey,” then
as now a ruin, as you contemplate). Now contemplate your favorite icon,
perhaps Rublev’s Trinity, or even El Greco’s early Byzantine work. These
are static, ordered, beautiful. Contemplating them gives rise to no frisson, no prickling of the neck-hair. Their saturated beauty serves instead
to assimilate those who contemplate them to the Lord in whom they participate. They are sacramental and therefore beautiful, not sublime. Now,
the point of such a thought-experiment (an experiment in vision) is not to
argue the superiority of one over another. It is rather to suggest that the
Christian tradition contains a long, pre-Romantic tradition of thought and
argument (not to mention violent and bloody disagreement, as between
the iconoclasts and their opponents) about the image and the human possibility of response to it, a tradition very largely absent from Hedley’s
book. Its presence shows that use of and response to the image comes in
many kinds, and that the kind so elegantly addressed and argued for by
Hedley in this book is only one of them.
Hedley’s is a brilliant and beautiful book. I think most of its conclusions
wrong, but I have nothing but admiration for his achievement in writing
it, and have been greatly instructed by reading it.

Is God a Delusion? A Reply to Religion’s Cultured Despisers, by Eric Reitan. Walden,
MA: Riley-Blackwell, 2009. Pp. 256. $89.95 (hardcover); $24.95 (paperback).
JACQUELINE MARIÑA, Purdue University
The main purpose of this book is to refute claims of New Atheists such
as Richard Dawkins, Christopher Hitchens, and Sam Harris. While the
book is successful in showing that the New Atheists have only the most
superficial understanding of what religion is really about, this is not what
is most valuable in it, or even its main point. Most relevant about this book
is the vision of authentic religion it presents, as well as the discussion it
provides of why morally committed rational agents might choose to believe in God. Reitan shows that the only argumentative force behind the
claims of the New Atheists is based on a fundamental equivocation. They
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claim all religious commitments are extremely dangerous, based on delusions having no rational foundation. Reitan convincingly shows that these
authors focus only on what really amounts to corrupt varieties of religion,
ignoring or explaining away all examples of religion’s more benign forms.
The book is roughly divided into two parts, corresponding to its two
principle aims. These are, first, a sketch of his vision of genuine religion
(contrasted with its corrupt forms) and second, an account of the grounds
for belief of morally committed rational agents. Chapters 1 through 4 provide an account of authentic religion and the significance it can have in a
believer’s life. Chapter 1, “On Religion and Equivocation,” convincingly
demonstrates that the view of religion put forward by the New Atheists is
narrow and unsatisfactory: for them, only religion in its most degenerate
and pernicious form counts as religion. Chapter 2, “The God Hypothesis,”
continues the project of the first chapter through an extended discussion
of the concept of God. Reitan examines New Atheist conceptions of God
and compares them with the idea of God developed in traditional theism.
Two things stand out in this chapter: first, Reitan points out that the New
Atheists leave goodness out of their account of God; second, Reitan briefly
discusses non-substantive definitions of the word “God,” which do not
provide a list of attributes through which to define God. Important here is
Reitan’s invocation of Schleiermacher’s understanding of God as the correlate of the feeling of absolute dependence, the “whence of our active
and receptive existence.” This is an ostensive definition tied to religious
experience. Reitan does not, however, provide a satisfactory account of
how this ostensive definition hooks up with his account of the attribute of
God’s goodness. How is this understanding of God’s goodness supposed
to work in tandem with his understanding of God as the correlate of the
feeling of absolute dependence? He gestures towards Schleiermacher’s
fundamental understanding of God in terms of love and wisdom, but a
strict account of why the correlate of the feeling of absolute dependence
must be understood in these terms is missing.
Here Reitan introduces one of the most significant and well-developed
themes of the book: the importance of the idea of God’s goodness to authentic religion. The fundamental issue at stake in the choice between a materialistic view of the world and a religious one is that of the good. If we choose
to understand the world as mindless matter in motion, then the world is indifferent to the good itself: human consciousness is simply an insignificant
epiphenomenon of atoms blindly colliding with one another, destined to
the final annihilation awaiting all living things. Authentic religion provides
a different vision, one providing a warrant for the ethico-religious hope
that behind the indifference of what appears in the empirical world there is
an Ultimate Reality that not only grounds and sustains everything that is,
but that ultimately guarantees that the universe is on the side of the good.
The third chapter, “Divine Tyranny and the Goodness of God,” develops
the idea of what it means to say that God is good, in part through a contrast
with notions of God portraying God as a tyrant, to be worshipped out of
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fear and the longing to put oneself on the side of ultimate power. Along
with Schleiermacher and Plutarch, Reitan argues that such a god is no god
at all, but the object of idolatry and superstition. If God is to be worthy of
worship we must envision God as good. The goodness of God is the gold
standard against which religious claims must be evaluated. This means that
concepts of God found in various types of fundamentalisms, in which the
wrath of God is ready to be rained on any one that does not believe in a
certain way, are fundamentally deficient.
Chapter 4, “Science, Transcendence, and Meaning,” tackles the evidentialist challenge initially put forward by Russell and echoed by Dawkins:
the God-hypothesis is equivalent to the hypothesis that there is a teapot in
the sky so infinitesimally small that it cannot, in principle, be detected by
any instrument. But why believe in something that cannot make any empirical difference, and for which, in principle, there can be no evidence?
According to Russell and Dawkins, such belief is irrational. Closely related to this issue is the question posed by Flew regarding the meaningfulness of assertions that are, in principle, neither verifiable nor falsifiable.
If a claim is to be meaningful, its being true must make some difference.
How then, do religious claims have meaning? Reitan points to the transcendence of God: because God is not a thing among things, we should
not expect to find the sorts of evidential traces left by things in order to
ground our belief in God. That would be a category mistake: God, as the
ground of all things, cannot be discovered in such a fashion. This does not
leave belief in the existence of God without meaning, however, for belief
in God has moral and existential import for how we view and react to the
world. Just as the world of the happy individual is different from that of
the unhappy individual, the world of the person confident in the hope
that the universe is ultimately for the good is different from that of the
person who thinks that the universe is pitilessly indifferent to it. In some
sense they see the same facts, but how they connect them and interpret
them, and consequently how they react to them, will be different.
The next four chapters examine rational grounds for belief in God’s existence. In laying out these grounds, Reitan’s goal is not to provide arguments conclusively proving the existence of God. Rather, he agrees with
John Hick that the evidence the world presents is ambiguous as to God’s
existence. This is not to say, however, that there is no rational basis for
religious belief. In chapter 5, Reitan discusses different versions of the argument from design, including the fine-tuning argument, and makes the
case that such arguments fail. He is much more optimistic about the cosmological argument, however, which he discusses in chapter 6. He concludes that if we accept the principle of sufficient reason, we must infer a
transcendent cause. He then identifies this transcendent cause with God
(138). This is by far the weakest part of the book. That he does not engage
Kant’s devastating critique of the cosmological argument is a major drawback: Kant argued that even if we were to concede that we must posit a
necessary being, it is impossible to show that such a necessary being is not
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finite and that it is convertible with the most perfect being. How then can
such a ground be identified with the God of traditional theism?
Chapter 7, “Religious Consciousness,” answers the New Atheist charge
that religious experiences are either as reliable as hallucinations (Dawkins)
or merely an experience of the dissolution of the illusory self (Harris).
Reitan uses William James’s characterization of mystical experience,
especially its ineffable character, to argue that this ineffability is just what
one would expect if one were to experience a transcendent and fundamental
ground of reality. He then presents a brief discussion of Schleiermacher’s
account of the feeling of absolute dependence, implying that it can help us
to understand the mystical experience of someone like Simone Weil. The
chapter covers a great deal of material, but it moves too quickly, skirting
over too many important issues. For instance, Reitan simply sides with
Walter Stace, affirming that the mystical experience is the same across cultures, and that only the interpretive lens through which it is understood
is different (a controversial issue). Assuming for the sake of argument that
he is correct, if the experience can be interpreted in myriad ways, it need
not be understood theistically. It may very well be the case that pantheistic or monistic interpretations of mysticism are correct; under such an
understanding the self as distinct is an illusion. Reitan knows this, but he
later argues that although direct experience of a unitary self is impossible,
we must posit such a self as that which unifies experience. But there are
important arguments against the validity of concluding that there is a substantial self on the basis of the unity of experience, a notable one being
Kant’s paralogisms. Reitan seems to be unaware of these, and too quickly
uses his argument to justify his claim that theistic mysticism, with its positing of a distinct self, is the highest stage of mysticism (158–159). His discussion of Schleiermacher is plagued by some of the same issues. For instance,
he does not touch upon whether, and in what sense, Schleiermacher was
a theist, especially given the metaphysical picture presented by him in On
Religion. Schleiermacher’s early work offers a pantheistic metaphysics.
Some of the most persuasive points in the book are developed in chapter 8, “The Substance of Things Hoped for.” Here belief in God is presented as providing a warrant for the ethical hope that behind the seeming
pitiless indifference of the empirical world, there is a transcendent ground
guaranteeing not only that all will, finally, be well, but that even the most
horrible suffering endured in this life ultimately has some meaning and
will be redeemed by God (this is the upshot of chapter 9, “Evil and the
Meaning of Life”). Genuine faith is a choice to live as if there is a God, in
trust and hope. It should not make claims to absolute knowledge. However, contra the New Atheists, Reitan shows that genuine faith is not blind,
but is firmly rooted in, and guided by, ethical commitments. As such, it
can ground moral judgments critical of human proclivities to claim absolute status for what is only finite and historically conditioned. In the last
chapter, “The Root of all Evil?,” Reitan argues that evil does not spring
from religion, but that religion can be poisoned by the human tendency to
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want to divide the world into in groups and out groups. He suggests that
such tendencies can only be overcome through the spiritual sustenance
that genuine religion can provide.
At times Reitan claims that theism is the best guarantor of the ethicoreligious hope (51); at others he affirms that “more than one world view”
can satisfy it (185). Throughout the book he does not always stick to his
more modest claim, and sometimes argues as if his arguments for theism
are more decisive than they are. Moreover, connections between the three
principle reasons for belief he provides, the cosmological argument, the
argument from religious experience, and the argument from ethical hope,
are not explored in depth. The author does succeed in showing that attacks
on faith by the New Atheists are based on both a very superficial understanding of religion and a failure to recognize that there are, indeed, rational
grounds for faith. Moreover, Reitan does a refreshing job sketching what
such a rational faith, based on a moral commitment to the good, looks like.

A Metaphysics for the Mob: The Philosophy of George Berkeley, by John Russell
Roberts. Oxford University Press, 2007. Pp. xxii + 172. $55.00 (hardcover).
DALE JACQUETTE, University of Bern, Switzerland
A book, not as I had hoped, about ontology and organized crime; rather,
John Russell Roberts’s study of George Berkeley’s eliminative immaterialism, takes its title from Berkeley’s Philosophical Commentaries, I §405: “All
things in the Scripture which side with the Vulgar against the Learned
side with me also. I side in all things with the Mob.”
It is a puzzling statement. One, indeed, that has perplexed even those
critics sympathetic to Berkeley’s empiricism, if not to his project as a whole,
expressing his rejection of a non-thinking substratum of sensibilia and
mind-independent things existing “without the mind.” Roberts proposes
to explain the commonsense nature of Berkeley’s philosophy, and in the
process tackles many other related topics in the background of Berkeley’s
thought and in contemporary discussions of Berkeley and the problems
with which he was engaged.
In the first half of the book, Roberts offers historical background to
Berkeley’s immaterialism. In the second half, he applies the exposition of
Berkeley’s ideas presented in the first part to an interesting choice of historical and contemporary philosophical problems, including links to an
extended form of Daniel C. Dennett’s concept of the intentional stance,
the thorny issue of Berkeley’s relation to Malebranche’s occasionalism as
a solution to the causal interaction problem for Cartesian substance dualism, and Wilfrid Sellars’s distinction between the manifest and scientific
images. Woven through this development of interrelated topics is Roberts’s
motivation to extrapolate Berkeley’s positive doctrine of spirit, an important

